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This paper examines the effect of' unions on productivity
within a sample of publicly and privately owned hospitals and
nursing homes to determine whether public ownership influences
union behavior. The results show that the productivity of' union
contractors is much greater in private than in public projects.
Within the sample of private projects, the estimates of the
union-nonunion productivity difference are generally positive
but very imprecise.
Steven G. Allen
Departmentof Economics and Business




Allen (1983) compared the productivity of union arid nonunion
contractors using two samples of construction projects:
commercial office buildings and elementary and secondary
schools.Measuring output both in terms of dollar value and
square footage, productivity was at least 30 percent higher for
union contractors in the commercial office building sample.In
the school sample, however, there was no strong evidence of any
un on—nonuni on productivity difference.
These conflicting results can be rationalized in two
ways.First, it is possible that the technologies for school and
office building construction are different and that nonunion
labor has a comparative advantage in the former and union labor
has a comparative advantage in the latter. This could arise
because of the differences in the size or complexity of the
projects.The mean square footage of the union projects in the
office building sample is 208,815, which is much larger than
the 27,319 square feet of the nonunion projects in that sample.
In contrast, there is very little difference in the mean size of
the union (98,108) and nonunion (85,250) projects in the school
sample.Furthermore, the union projects in the office building
sample are much larger than the union projects in the school
sample.These size differences may result in biased estimates
because there are much greater economies of scale in the union
projects in bothsamples(but not inthenonunion projects).t
Thus,the appearance of a uni on producti vity advantage in office
bui. ldjn. copstructj on mj resulL rrom the greater un on-nonunion2
difference in project size.In the school sample, however,the
union and nonunion buildings are of similar size, so that neither
scaleeconomy differences nor productivity differences between
union and nonunion contractors are observed.
The other possibility focuses on differences in ownershi p
between the two samples.The office buildings are privately
owned and the schools are owned by state or local governments.
This can have two types of effects.First, state and local
governments impose a number of restrictions on materials and
techniques that are not present in the building codes for private
projects. These restrictions may limit the ability of union and
nonunion contractors to choose the optimal mix of inputs, causing
any private sector productivity differences to vanish.This is
essentially a technological argument as well, with the focus
being on regulation instead of size.
Second, ownership affects incentives. State and local
governments have less incentive to minimize costs than do the
owners of commercial office buildings.This lack of incentive,
combined with prevailing wage laws that prevent nonunion
contractors from entering union strongholds and bidding practices
that facilitate collusion, allows unions and contractors to
collect rents in public construction.2 Freeman and Medoff (1934)
and Hirsch (1985) have speculated that the effect oi unionism on
productivity is more likely to be zero or negative in noncompet
itive markets.If the market for public construction is not
sufficiently competitive, this could account for the absence of3
union—nonunion productivity difference in the school sample.
A data set that holds technology constant but that contains
both publicly and privately owned projects is needed to determine
which set of interpretations--the former focusing on technology,
the latter focusing on economics--is correct. This paper
examines such a data set, a sample of hospitals and nursing
homes completed in 1976.These projects are covered by the same
Du1.Lu1n regu.Lallons, as ai.i. were unueu unuer LflC
program.This permits a direct test of the hypothesis that the
effect of unions on productivity in construction varies between
publicly and privately owned projects.One complicating factor
is that the privately owned hospitals and nursing homes in this
sample are non-profit organizations, so the focus is on the
effects of differences in ownership rather than on the effects of
the incentive of profit maximization.Clearly, it would be
desirable to compare the effects of unions on productivity in
private for-profit, private non-profit, and public construction.
II.Empirical Specification and Data
The effect of unions on productivity is estimated by
allowing the intercept of a Cobb-Douglas production function to
vary by union status.The specification includes a control for
labor quality and allows for nonconstant returns. Capital,
labor, labor quality, and union status are all defined in
the same ways for the hospital sample as for the commercial
office building sample in Allen (1983). Value added, square
footage, and beds are used as output measures.Most attention is4
focused on the first two measures because the last measure
does not take into account facilities such as operating rooms,
laboratories, and special equipment, which are important
components of output.
The data set was collected as part of the BLS Labor and
Material Requirements series.It contains 36 union and 8
nonunion observations, of which 10 and 3 represent publicly owned
projects.4 An interaction term between union and public owner-
ship status is used to test the hypothesis that the effect of
unions on productivity is smaller in publicly owned buildings.
A dummy for public ownership was also examined. Its coefficient
was smaller than its standard error and is not included in
most of the specifications reported below.
The buildings in this sample vary in two other important
respects: B of the projects are nursing homes and 29 are
additions.These factors, along with public ownership, could
affect the coefficients of the capital—labor ratio, labor hours,
labor quality, or union status.To test this, iiateraction terms
betceen these four variables and dummies indicating public
ownership, nursing homes, and additions were estimated in a
varietz of combinations. One interaction--between nursing homes
and the capital-labor ratio--was simultaneously helpful in
explaining the patterns in the data while being consistent with
reasonable priors regarding the sign of the coefficient. It is
included in some of the specifications below.
A set of control variables for building characteristics and5
materials must also be included in the model in order to avoid
bias in the union coefficient resulting from differences in
design and amenities that are correlated with union status.The
distribution of union and nonunion projects for a number of
characteristics is reported in Table 1.Fifty percent of the
nonunion observations are nursing homes in contrast to only 11
percent of the union observations.Both in terms of stories and
square footage, the union buildings are much larger than the
nonunion buildings. There is no difference in scale economies by
union status in this sample, however, so this factor is less
likely to bias the results reported below.
There are a few important differences in the structural
features of the union and nonunion observations. All of the
nonunion observations have parking facilities, but 30 percent of
the union observations do not.Failure to control for this
factor would bias upward the estimated effect of unionism on pro-
ductivity. The greater use of masonry interior walls in the
nonunion observations produces the same bias, as labor require-
ments tend to be greatest for such walls. Nonunion observations
are more likely to have a steel frame, which biases the estimated
effect of unionism downward because more units of labor are
required to erect a steel frame than a concrete one.The same
argument applies to the greater use of steel decking than
concrete as the roof base of the nonunion observations.The
impact of the greater use of masonry than concrete exterior walls
in the nonunion sample is difficult to predict, as no distinction6
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Nursing home 11 50
New 36 25
Addition 64 75
Publicly owned 28 38






50, 000 or less 22 50
50,001-100, 000 19 38
100,001 or more 58 12
Parking
Outdoor 67 100
















Steel decking 17 38
Concrete 78 62
Other 6 07
is made in the data between precast and poured concrete.On
balance, it is difficult to say without examining the data which
set of potential biases dominates.
The union and nonunion samples are more similar in terms of
the types of facilities included in each building, as shown in
Table 2.A useful summary measure of the proportion of the
building allocated to special purpose areas is the ratio of beds
to square footage.As the proportion of space used for special
purposes increases, this ratio declines. Looking at hospitals
and nursing homes combined, this ratiç is much higher for
nonunion buildings. This is somewhat misleading, however, because
half the nonunion buildings are nursing homes.When this
comparison is made for hospitals only, the ratios for union and
nonunion buildings are about the same.There are no major
differences by union status in the percentage of hospitals with
emergency rooms and intensive care units. Nonunion hospitals are
more likely to have delivery rooms, while union hospitals are
more likely to have operating rooms, X-ray rooms, and
laboratories. Once again, the net effect of these
differences is unclear ex ante.
To select which building characteristics to include in the
empirical model, I followed the procedure in Allen (1983).
Characteristics are included if they are observed in more than
one building, their coefficients were consistent with the
engineering data in the 1977 Dodge Construction Systems
Costs manual, and their coefficients were larger than their8
Table 2
Facilitiesin Hospitals and Nursing Homes, by Union Status
Variable Union Nonunion
Meanbeds per 1, 000 sq. ft. , 1.16 1. 80
hospitals and nursing homes
Mean beds per 1, 000 sq. ft. , 1.03 1. 05
hospitals only
Percent of hospitals with:
Emergency room 75 75
Intensive care unit 81 75
Delivery room 56 100
Operating room 81 50
X-ray room 75 50
Laboratory 72 509
standard errors. This resulted in the following variables being
included in the model:number of stories, frame, interior wall,
and parking.All other characteristics failed to meet one or
more of these criteria.
III.Results
Three specifications of the model are reported in Table 3.
In the first, all interaction terms and building characteristics
variables are omitted.In the second, the interaction terms are
added.The third includes the interaction terms and the building
characteristics. Results are reported for each of the three
output measures:value added, square footage, and beds. The
results for beds were not sensitive to the inclusion of building
characteristics, so this specification is not reported.
In the simplest specifications (columns 1, 4, and 7), there
is no significant productivity difference between union and
nonunion contractors. This is not altogether surprising, as each
sample contains publicly and privately owned projects and the
effect of unionism is restricted to be the same for each type of
project.When this restriction is removed columns 2, 5, and
8), the union coefficient (corresponding to privately owned
projects only) increases substantially, suggesting higher
productivityforunion contractors than for nonunion contractors
inprivately owned projects.The interaction term,indicating
the difference between theeffectof unions on productivity in
publiclyand privately owned projects, is negative in all10
Table3
Unpital ad Nursiag(etaPruductiuhectic.Estiuatis
Odp;t vain,: Yalta added Square feat ku
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 7) (I)
letarcept —3.142 —6.53 —7.643 3.651 —2.023 —1.3OO11.631 5.220
(12.143) (12.754)(11.694)(15.231)(15.346) (12.746)(24.591)(25.211)
lug(IlL) .156 .221 .325 .151 .247 .217 .414 .516
(.396) 1.104) (.099) (.313) (.125) 1.1013 (.154) (.211)
IN (LI -.239 —.226 -.215 —.314 -.290 -.299 -.567 —.557
(.059) (.059) (.063) (.0701 (.071) (.069) (.099) (.104)
Miii .353 .273 .196 .093 .162 .276 —.134 —.023
(.170) (.1721 (.162) (.202) (.206) (.177) (.337) (.352)
kdill010 sq. It. —.217 —.203 —.365. —.11: —.169 —.049
(.66) 1.065) (.063) (.079) (.371) (.069)
Labrquality .191 1.409 1.511 .004 .606 .491 —1.345 —.631
(cdix (1.426)(1.415)(1.306) (1.692)(1.702)(1.424)(2.7!4)(2.522)
Ie?tkast .226 .173 .233 —.442 —.131 —.545 —.210 —.261
(.156) (.154) (.153) (.156) (.202) (.167) 3.309) (.344)
Perth Catral .391 .029 —.002 .363 —.001 .310 .412 .337
(.136) (.131) (.124) .1.161) (.163) (.136) (.265) (.275)
lest .155 .150 .132 —.216 —.231 —.290.1fl —.113
(.314)(.3W (.150) (.195) (.196) (.114) (.324) (.333)
Petal -.255 —.231 —.170 -.352 —.142 .007 .106 .170
(.113) (.112) (.104) (.131) (.131) (.114) (.222) (.229)
leg OW..) x —.176 -.393 -.325 -.356 —.245
ansteg Iii. :.zos; (.200) (.250) (.215) (.427)
Cite, a -.193 -.272 123 -.314 -.239
public uveerahlp (.123) (.316) (.141) (.127) (.251)






. (.323) . (.145)
Parkiagtacledad —.143 —.171
(.107) (.116)
.296 .257 .253 .352 .346 .275 .516 .559
P .631 .674 .779 .411 .519 .732 .612 .630
F 6.45 6.00 6.55 3.36 3.14 5.13 6.59 5.62
PetitStasdard utters are reputed buecath each ceafficlast. The vae (S.0.) if tie depesdaut
variableii celu.eae 1 thuggi 3 is 2.146 (.434); ciiaai 4 tbreegh 6, —.521 (.4301;
cahaas 7 aid 5, —7.427 (.549).Thereare 44 ebeervatisus ii each eqeatie;.11
three cases.Although this is consistent with the notion that
unions are less likely to have positive effects on productivity
in publicly owned projects, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected for either the union or the union-public ownership
interaction coeffi ci ents.
When building characteristics are added to the model in
columns 3 and 6, the union-public ownership coefficients increase
considerably in absolute value, their standard errors decline,
and the null hypothesis can be rejected. In the specification
in which output is measured as value added, productivity is 31
percent lower in publicly owned hospitals built by union contrac-
tors than in privately owned hospitals built by them. When
output is measured as square footage, the productivity of
union contractors is 37 percent lower in publicly owned hospitals
than in privately owned hospitals.
The productivity of union contractors is 32 percent higher
than that of nonunion contractors for privately owned hospitals
in the square footage per hour model, an estimate that is
significantly different from zero at the 87 percent confidence
level using a two-tailed test.Although this is admittedly a
rather weak result, it is consistent with my earlier results for
the sample of privately owned office buildings. In the value
added per hour specification, union contractor productivity is 22
percent higher, but the confidence level is only 76 percent.It
is interesting that the union coefficient is smaller in this
specification despite the strong possibility of upward bias12
involved with measuring output in terms of value added.For
publicly owned hospitals, the estimates in columns 3 and 6 show
union productivity to be 14 to 8 percent lower than nonunion
productivity, with neither point estimate significantly different
from zero.
A four—way comparison between private-nonunion,
private-union, public-nonunion, and public-union productivity can
be made by adding a dummy variable indicating public ownership to
the specifications in columns 3 and 6.The coefficients of the
variables indicating the impact of unionism and public ownership
are:
Value added Square feet
speci fication specifi cation
Union .316 .208
(.208) (.230)
Public ownership .227 -.128
(.246) (.271)
Union x -.495 —.188
Public ownership C .268) ( .295)
In both specifications, the standard errors of the union and
union interaction terms increase considerably when the public
ownership dummy is added to the model. Given the small size of
the data set and the correlation betweeithe interaction term and
both dummy variables, it is not at all surprising that these
coefficients are not estimated very precisely. This does
not necesarily mean that the data fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no union and public ownership effects, even in the
square feet specification where all three coefficients are13
smaller than the standard error.The appropriate test of the
null hypothesis is a joint F-test.Under this test the null
hypothesis can be rejected at the 89 percent level in the value
added specification and the 90 percent level in the square feet
specification.
The results of the four-way productivity comparison are
(using private nonunion projects as a benchmark):
Value added Square feet
specification speci fication
Private union 37% 23%
Public nonunion 25% -14%
Public union 5% -10%
Although the imprecision of the coefficients means that these
comparisons should be interpreted as very weak results, they
point to the same conclusion as the results in columns 3 and 6:
union productivity is at least 30 percent greater in the private
sector than in the public sector.
One troubling aspect of these results is that they suggest
no correlation between the capital-labor ratio and productivity
in nursing home construction.To determine whether the finding
of' lower union contractor productivity in public (as opposed to
private) construction is sensitive to this, the specifications in
columns 3 and 6 were re-estimated over a sample containing only
the 36 hospitals (not reported in Table 3).The union-public
ownership interictions declined slightly (bynomore than .03)1L
andremained significantly different from zero.Excluding
nursing homes did have a big effect on theunion coefficientin
the value added specification, which dropped to near zero.The
union coefficient in the square footage specification changed
very little, but its standard error increased, presumably
because of the smaller sample size.Thus, while the key result
that the productivity of union contractors in private
Flfl in l 4 Y' 1 1 r, 4- i en n 4 c a a 4 a r F inin F 1, a 4 ,.in r' in A , It' 4 4r i F x ri n in H 1 4
constructionseems fairly robust, the already weak results on
union-nonunion productivity differences in private construction
become even weaker when nursing homes are excluded from the
sample.
To see how the effect of unions on productivity compares
with their effect on wages, a log wage equation was estimated
over a sample containing separate observations for each detailed
occupation employed by each contractor. In addition to union
status, the independent variables included dummies for region
(3), SMSA, and detailed occupation (74).Theresults (shown in
Table L)demonstratethat controlling for detailed occupation,
union workers receive 17 percent higher wages than nonunion
workers.This estimate of the wage gap in construction is
smaller than those reported in Allen (1983).The most likely
explanation is that the entire hospital and nursing home sample
was funded under the Hill—Burton program, which means that
minimum wages on each project must be set by the Department of'
Labor,as requi red by the Davis-Bacon Act.Since the Department15
Table Lj.
WageEquation Estimates, Hospitals and Nursing Homes
Equation


















Note: Standard errorsappear in parentheses below each
coefficient. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of the ratio of payroll to hours worked and has a mean
S. D. ) of2. 037 ( .350). No intercept is reported in
the second column because the controls for detailed
occupation were obtained with the absorption option in
the SAS GLM procedure.16
of Labor frequently tends to set minimum wages for federally
funded building construction at union levels, one would naturally
expect a rather small union-nonunion wage gap.The relative
magnitude of the union-nonunion wage and productivity gap
estimates implies that union contractors compete on near equal
terms with nonunion contractors in private hospital
construction. This is not the case in public hospital
firnc,4— rn,.4 4 rs vt Tn n4 nI,nocnn nne nn 4.4I, cv tin,,.n nr.n 4—vinfl 4-,,no no L.A 4'.. L. S L.1AA. £ LSiASS ASLflL.LC %1Jt.LSIJJtAILStJSSAAk.LtAL..L.S#LcaLc LAi..J t,.
offsetby higher productivity. This increase in costs implies
that either union contractors receive lower profits for public
hospital construction or the price of public hospitals to state
and local governments will be higher when they are built by union
contractors.Evidence supporting the latter interpretation is
reported in Allen (19814).
IV.Conclusion
Over a sample of publicly and privately owned hospitals
constructed with similar technologies and covered by the same
types of building regulations, the productivity of union
contractors is much greater in private than in public projects.
This finding suggests that it is the pattern of ownership
rather than technological or regulatory factors that accounts for
niy earlier findings of higher union productivity in private
office building construction but no union-nonunion productivity
difference in public school construction. The bottom line seems
to be that the behavior of unions and union contractors is quite
dI,rferert in public and private construction, the consequence of17
whichseemsto be vastly inflated construction costs for public
Proj ects.
The evidence reported here on union-nonunion productivity
differences is much weaker.Clearly, there is no such difference
in public hospital and nursing home construction. In private
projects, the productivity of union contractors does seem to be
higher, especially in terms of square footage per hour, but the
hypothesis of no union-nonunion productivity difference can be
rejected at no better than an 87 percent confidence level. This
will probably not change anyone's opinion on the matter.18
Notes
1Evidenceon union—nonunion differences in economies of'
scale is reported in Allen (198'4).
2This argument is more full stated in Allen ( 1983; 1984)
Thespecification is identical to thatin equation (3) in
Allen(1983).
4Sampling procedures and a copy of the questionnaire are
ITcr 4.,-.rr (1 flO LII U. . jJaL ' LQ.WJL
5Thisevidence on economies of scale is reported in
Allen (1984).
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